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Abstract
The rapid dynamics of COVID-19 calls for quick and effective tracking of virus transmission chains and early detection of 
outbreaks, especially in the “phase 2” of the pandemic, when lockdown and other restriction measures are progressively 
withdrawn, in order to avoid or minimize contagion resurgence. For this purpose, contact-tracing apps are being proposed 
for large scale adoption by many countries. A centralized approach, where data sensed by the app are all sent to a nation-
wide server, raises concerns about citizens’ privacy and needlessly strong digital surveillance, thus alerting us to the need to 
minimize personal data collection and avoiding location tracking. We advocate the conceptual advantage of a decentralized 
approach, where both contact and location data are collected exclusively in individual citizens’ “personal data stores”, to be 
shared separately and selectively (e.g., with a backend system, but possibly also with other citizens), voluntarily, only when 
the citizen has tested positive for COVID-19, and with a privacy preserving level of granularity. This approach better protects 
the personal sphere of citizens and affords multiple benefits: it allows for detailed information gathering for infected people 
in a privacy-preserving fashion; and, in turn this enables both contact tracing, and, the early detection of outbreak hotspots 
on more finely-granulated geographic scale. The decentralized approach is also scalable to large populations, in that only 
the data of positive patients need be handled at a central level. Our recommendation is two-fold. First to extend existing 
decentralized architectures with a light touch, in order to manage the collection of location data locally on the device, and 
allow the user to share spatio-temporal aggregates—if and when they want and for specific aims—with health authorities, 
for instance. Second, we favour a longer-term pursuit of realizing a Personal Data Store vision, giving users the opportunity 
to contribute to collective good in the measure they want, enhancing self-awareness, and cultivating collective efforts for 
rebuilding society.
Keywords COVID-19 · Personal data store · Mobility data analysis · Contact tracing
Introduction
National authorities are currently addressing the rapid spread 
of SARS-CoV-2 through strong control measures aimed at 
containing the diffusion of the virus and slowing it to levels 
that can be managed by health-care and socio-political insti-
tutions. Knowing where and when the diffusion is taking 
place is essential for shortening the emergency period, and 
for better focusing countermeasures where they are actually 
needed. The imposition of generalized and strong emergency 
measures limiting citizen liberty appears to be not the opti-
mal approach, and it is, in part, an effect of our poor knowl-
edge of how and where exactly the virus is circulating and 
outbreaks are growing.
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Personal big data, in particular those able to describe the 
movement of people in greater detail, should be seen as a 
potentially powerful weapon in combatting the pandemic. 
For example in contact tracing, that is, revealing the places 
a patient who has tested positive has visited in recent days 
(thus identifying places in risk of contagion) in addition to 
the people the user has been in contact with (thus identify-
ing specific people at risk). Indeed, very recent simulation 
results (Ferretti et al. 2020) have clearly shown that immedi-
ate tracing of infected people—ideally from the pre-sympto-
matic phase – could significantly contribute to reducing the 
individual’s infection rate (the well-known R0 index) below 
1. Also, it has been found that over 75% of individuals who 
reported being positive for COVID-19 had been in close 
contact with another individual—who they knew—infected 
by COVID-19 (Oliver et al. 2020).
Analyzing contact traces and other individual mobil-
ity data potentially raises risks for the individual privacy, 
and that is at the core of current debates about the best 
trade-off between privacy and data value for public health. 
One example is South Korea, which made the movement 
of positive patients de facto public, clearly favouring data 
value (with excellent results in containment of virus spread) 
while sacrificing patient privacy (who risks a social stigma, 
potentially dissuading people from exposing and testing 
for the virus Zastrow 2020). In contrast, various European 
efforts lean toward strong individual personal data protec-
tion, stipulating clear requirements that data collection apps 
should satisfy (10 requirements for the evaluation of “Con-
tact Tracing” apps 2020) and promoting a unified European 
approach (Manancourt 2020). We believe it is possible to 
reap the benefits of contact tracing, including collection of 
location data with a privacy preserving level of granularity, 
without forgoing personal data protection altogether while 
enhancing trust. GDPR compliance, abiding to the principle 
of privacy/data protection by design and privacy/data protec-
tion by default, enables the benefits of location data.
Existing proposals and their limitations
Learning from current success stories as well as controver-
sies, various teams of researchers and developers are now 
proposing a different vision where privacy protection is a 
must, and solutions are designed to extract useful data with-
out sharing personal sensitive information. In particular, the 
spatial information associated with the individual citizens 
(where they stay or move) is considered to be too sensi-
tive, and difficult to protect. An important research direc-
tion is the privacy-safe, spatially-oblivious implementation 
of proximity-tracing, that in this context basically repre-
sents the ability to reconstruct the close contacts with other 
people that an individual had before being tested positive. 
A strongly decentralized representative of this direction 
is the DP3T (Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity 
Tracing 2020) approach. The solution is based on mobile 
phone apps that continuously collect the list of anonymous, 
dynamically changing, app-generated IDs of other phones 
(which, therefore, need to have the app installed, too) that 
had close and prolonged contacts with the device. With 
DP3T, the trusted authority simply broadcasts the anony-
mous app-generated IDs of the positive patient’s phone, and 
each contact needs to check the list to find themselves. The 
recent joint effort by Apple and Google to provide Android 
and iOS system-level support for contact tracing through and 
hoc APIs (Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact 
Tracing Technology 2020) also goes in this direction. A sim-
ilar view, yet leaning towards a centralized management of 
the anonymous contact traces, is provided by the PEPP-PT 
initiative (Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Trac-
ing 2020), where the broadcasting phase is replaced with a 
different communication way where positive users provide 
the list of “contacted” anonymous app-generated IDs to the 
trusted central authority, who is then able to directly call and 
warn the phones in the list1.
The strong point of these approaches lies in the simplicity 
of the information used, which allow easy and rapid imple-
mentations able to guarantee privacy protection (obviously 
stronger in the completely decentralized solutions). While 
we believe that these approaches are on the right track and 
particularly useful in the short term, we also emphasize that 
limiting the analysis to simple contact (close-range proxim-
ity) data limits the efficacy. One point is that the discover-
ability of potentially exposed contacts is by design limited 
to those who have the app installed (both the positive person 
and the exposed one), making it impactful only after a criti-
cal mass of users is reached (some models suggest 60% is 
the optimal threshold (Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow 
or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmissionand Ease Us out of 
Lockdown 2020)). Also, only direct contacts are detected, 
thus not considering surface-touch contamination, which is 
a typical phenomenon in large shared spaces, like supermar-
kets and such, considered to be a potential vector of diffu-
sion (van Doremalen 2020). Another important task would 
be to quickly detect outbreak hotspots, and for this purpose 
spatial and temporal information could be a key ingredient. 
Spatial-temporal information within a privacy preserving 
architecture (e.g. appropriate granularity levels, clear access 
rights and aims for data processing, enhanced security, etc.) 
1 Due to its centralized perspective and to alleged transparency 
issues, the PEPP-PT model has been later at the center of discussions, 
various key partners left the consortium and its weight in the Euro-
pean scenario shrank significantly. At the time of writing, the refer-
ence website and GitHub repository have not been updated for several 
months.
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can provide vital granular aggregate data with a modest or 
null impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, see for 
example the MIT Private Kit Safe Path initiative (Raskar 
et al. 2020).
Our proposal
Our claim is very simple: limiting data flow at its very 
source is not the best answer. Individual citizens—and only 
them—should be able to collect detailed information about 
their own position and movement, together with other types 
of data, including (in the direction of previous proposals) 
pseudo-IDs of devices at close distance. The means for safe-
guarding privacy should instead be in providing the users 
with full control of such data, together with the necessary 
tools for sharing only the information they want at the pre-
ferred level of detail, to customise sharing of information 
depending on the individuals/entities with whom they are 
sharing, and for evaluating pros and cons of each sharing 
option.
The paradigm we envision is based on a Personal Data 
Store (Giannotti et al. 2012; de Montjoye et al. 2014; Study 
xxxx) where users collect and manage all their own data, 
equipped with data management and analytics tools for 
elaborating them, as well as with functionalities for con-
trolling what kind of information—raw or derived from 
data – should be shared with other users or with authorities. 
The main points of the approach we envision, based on such 
environment, are the following: 
1. Each user has a personal software environment (either 
directly on the smart phone or in the cloud) where they 
can store, elaborate and control their own data in an 
exclusive way. No third-party has access to this data.
2. The personal software environment of the user is a tool 
they can actively decide to use to perform actions, for 
instance to help in providing correct information to 
health authorities in case they are tested positive to 
COVID-19; or simply to contribute to public safety by 
joining some collective computation of global statistics 
useful to improve countermeasures. We stress the fact 
that any sharing of the user’s data or aggregates must 
happen only if the user wants to, and no authority should 
be able to access anything without the user’s consent. 
The PDS aims to empower the individual’s memory 
and inference capabilities, and its inviolability should 
be guaranteed both by technological means and by its 
social recognition as a basic right of individuals.
3. When the user decides to share information, they define 
the aggregates to share, taking into consideration the 
minimum spatial and temporal granularity of the infor-
mation needed to realize the service. The environment 
provides the functionalities to define the minimum data 
requirement and to compute and share the data. A key 
point is that deciding the best trade-off between privacy 
and data utility might require a knowledge that is avail-
able only late in the process, because the context might 
change either the utility of a given type of data or the 
priorities of the individual.
4. The information sharing can happen in two modalities:
– A simple transfer to a trusted authority of the 
minimum data needed to realize the service, for 
instance the list of close contacts (e.g. as hashed 
mac-addresses that only the contact themselves can 
recognize) similar to PEPP-PT and DP3T; or the list 
of locations visited, in the form of Points of Interest 
or municipalities, useful to find potential outbreaks 
hotspots.
– When possible, through a collaborative, distributed 
computation of global aggregates involving the 
information of the user, e.g. using secure multi-party 
computation techniques Lindell and Pinkas (2008) 
or specific privacy-preserving distributed meth-
ods (Meng-Chang 2012).
5. The data shared by users during and for the COVID-
19 emergency must be treated in accordance with two 
basic requirements: Use Limitation Principle and finite, 
contextual life-span of data, i.e. the data collected is 
used solely for the purpose of COVID-19 containment, 
and the life-span is limited and declared at the time of 
collection, and the data will auto-destruct at the end of 
the period. Both constraints can only partially be imple-
mented by means of policies, and technical tools must 
be developed to verify that the policies on use are actu-
ally followed and implemented, such as adopting formal 
methods of program verification or cryptographic data 
auto-destruction techniques—both still not adequately 
developed to scale as needed. Finally, standards for 
personal mobility and proximity data management, 
defining policies regulating data gathering, storage and 
destruction need to be developed by joint bodies that 
will include researchers from the government, industry 
and academia.
6. The information provided by authorities (possibly thanks 
to the individual contributions) about risky areas and 
possible contacts with positive patients can be joined 
with the complete information the user has about them-
selves, providing a data analytics-enabled self-awareness 
of own behaviour and the potential points of risk. For 
instance, the user might not realize that their own daily 
home-work routine involves passing through an area that 
has an increased level of risk, and the analysis might 
suggest modifying the route to work. Note that such 
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level of detailed information would only be available 
locally to the specific user, as it comes from “merging” 
global information provided by centralised entities (e.g., 
a nation-wide authority) with local information available 
only to the individual user (on their devices).
This proposal (like the DP3T and PEPP-PT initiatives) 
exemplifies a distinctively European approach of aiming to 
co-realize important moral obligations—in this case for pub-
lic health and saving lives, together with respecting rights 
and fundamental freedoms – instead of choosing for a quick 
solution that relativizes one of our conflicting obligations.
Maintaining the trust of citizens at a time of crisis like 
the current one is a priority. This includes respecting the 
requirements for maintaining fundamental respect for human 
rights, ethical principles and existing legislation. A user-cen-
tric approach will also ensure that data is only used during 
the duration of the crisis and that the user has the control to 
end the tracking once the need is over. Our proposal lever-
ages both the respect for individual freedoms and for the 
environment, by cultivating feelings of solidarity and a sense 
of collective responsibility for rebuilding society.
Recommendations
Summarizing, our view is that emergency situations like the 
COVID-19 pandemic represent a strong case—yet one not 
unique—where providing people complete control of the 
data they produce and collect and how they are shared (and, 
maybe, an improved awareness of what they are collecting) 
can provide an edge in facing complex challenges. Initiating 
(centralized or decentralized) data collection with rigid pre-
defined privacy and data quality requirements and excluding 
the human from the decision loop can often be suboptimal.
Our main recommendation, therefore, is to work on two 
parallel tracks: in the short-term and in the long-term. In the 
short term, the decentralized architectures currently under 
development for social contact tracing (in particular, PEPP-
PT and D3PT) should be extended to manage the collection 
of location data locally on the device. A loose integration 
between the two components (contact and location data) 
should be provided, that keeps them logically independent 
and mutually not linkable. This allows us to maintain all the 
privacy-by-design benefits of the contact tracing solutions 
mentioned above, but the moment users are confirmed as a 
positive case, it allows them to voluntarily provide additional 
contextual information in a privacy-preserving way (on top 
of independently triggering the PEPP-PT or D3PT contact 
tracing mechanisms), that can contribute to the computation 
of useful global aggregates (European Commission 2020), 
such as spatio-temporal density maps (Monreale et al. 2013) 
to identify potential infection hubs through location data.
Over a longer-term, deep-impact actions should be inves-
tigated to realize a Personal Data Store approach, where the 
user can collect all their data in a decentralized, safe and 
controlled way, equipped with tools to analyze the data and 
understand its potential value (for instance, to contribute 
improving public good) as well as the potential conse-
quences that sharing data or aggregates can have on their 
privacy. The aim is to enable more effective emergency 
countermeasures based on a novel connection between col-
lective good and the huge information treasure that each 
individual brings with themselves.
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